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Executive Summary
T his paper summarizes the results of a review ofnearly 500 judicial opinions decided as of fall 2006,involving access to protected health information
(PHI) and privacy of medical information under the fed-
eral Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA). This review was undertaken to de-
termine whether HIPAA, which permits application of
state privacy laws that are more stringent than the fed-
eral privacy standard, acts as a legal barrier to the cre-
ation of interoperable health information systems that
permit transparency of health information. The avail-
ability of transparent and complete information regard-
ing health system performance has been recognized as
essential to improving the quality of care and reducing
health care disparities.
This exhaustive review of existing HIPAA court deci-
sions provides no evidence that allowing more stringent
state laws to be enforced impedes providers’ access to
essential patient information. Nor does it create ob-
stacles to the use of such information to improve qual-
ity, or to the aggregation and de-identification of such
information for use in transparent reporting.
Out of 113 HIPAA preemption cases that squarely fo-
cus on an alleged conflict between the HIPAA privacy
rule and state law, only 13 cases involve situations
where the court views state laws as more stringent than
HIPAA, and none of the decided cases involve the de-
nial of access to providers who seek personal health in-
formation for the purposes of treatment, quality im-
provement, or the production of transparent informa-
tion.
Indeed, HIPAA preemption litigation appears to focus
on situations involving the disclosure of PHI as part of
the legal process, rather than the use of this information
to improve quality, reduce disparities, or create trans-
parency. The most common type of case is one in which
a health care provider is seeking to use HIPAA to shield
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PHI from disclosure or to obtain PHI to defend himself
or herself in malpractice or tort liability litigation. There
is no evidence that more stringent state privacy laws are
precluding health care providers either from securing
essential information at the point of treatment or from
participating in health information transparency pro-
grams. Even in the few cases where state law has been
found to be more stringent than the federal HIPAA pri-
vacy standard, courts uniformly underscore the power
of providers to control data disclosure within the exist-
ing HIPAA framework without violating state law.
If anything, HIPAA—far from being undermined by
the continued vitality of more stringent state laws—
permits covered entities to substitute their own uniform
policies for variable state disclosure laws. If covered en-
tities desire to disclose the requested PHI, they gener-
ally can do so, either by adopting a disclosure policy
that permits disclosure, by observing a state reporting
requirement, or by exercising an exception to a state
privilege law. Based on the cases under HIPAA to date,
covered entities that do not want to disclose informa-
tion stand an excellent chance of persuading a court
that HIPAA classifies most disclosures as permitted and
therefore, the decision to disclose is up to the entity.
Whether covered entities understand or acknowledge
their power to determine health information transpar-
ency and establish such norms is doubtful at this point,
given the extensive litigation seeking clarification of du-
ties and rights of covered entities under HIPAA.
Ultimately, states may desire to achieve greater uni-
formity where personal health information privacy
standards are concerned. But the HIPAA preemption
cases decided to date suggest that a federal effort to leg-
islatively preempt state privacy standards would have
limited relevance to the development of interoperable
information systems or systems in which health infor-
mation transparency is integral to quality improvement.
Moreover, such an effort to preempt all state laws relat-
ing to privacy of individually identifiable medical infor-
mation could mire the federal government deeply into
questions of how the states’ legal processes work and
interfere with long-established state civil and criminal
procedural rules regarding the disclosure of data in re-
lation to malpractice and other liability claims.
Introduction
This analysis, part of the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation’s ‘‘Legal Barriers to Health Information’’
project, examines the preemption provisions of HIPAA.
Specifically, this analysis evaluates the extent to which
HIPAA preemption poses a legal barrier to secure and
interoperable1 health information systems that can sup-
port quality improvement while also advancing the
broad policy goal of public reporting of aggregated, de-
identified data measuring progress in improving health
care quality and reducing health care disparities.
The evidence reviewed in this analysis consists of
nearly 500 judicial decisions decided as of November
2006 involving the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Of these cases,
113 involved interpretation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
as it relates to state laws governing personal health in-
formation.
Following a discussion of the background underlying
this issue and the research methodology used to con-
duct our review, we examine cases that have focused on
the issue of ‘‘HIPAA preemption’’—that is the provi-
sions in HIPAA that address the relationship between
the minimum federal standards governing the use and
disclosure of certain individually identifiable health in-
formation (‘‘protected health information’’ or ‘‘PHI’’)
and state laws.
HIPAA creates federal legal preemption of state laws
that are ‘‘contrary to’’ HIPAA’s privacy ‘‘floor,’’ while si-
multaneously saving from preemption state laws that
establish ‘‘more stringent’’ privacy rights for individu-
als. However, misunderstandings about the breadth,
scope, and content of HIPAA’s basic rules, and the flex-
ibility that covered entities have to design their own pri-
vacy policies appear to contribute to the perception that
HIPAA and its preemption provisions may impede the
development of interoperable and transparent health
care information systems.
Finally, we conclude this analysis with a discussion of
the implications of our findings for health information
system transparency and interoperability.
Background
An Overview of HIPAA and its Preemption Provisions
Enacted in 1996, HIPAA was a far-reaching law with
multiple aims, including improving health insurance
portability, reducing health care fraud, and promoting
the quality and efficiency of health care through admin-
istrative simplification and computerization of health
care information.2 Recognizing the compelling need to
protect the privacy and security of personal health in-
formation in an era of electronic information transfer,
Congress instructed the secretary of health and human
services to develop regulatory standards. Following a
lengthy public comment period, the secretary issued the
final Privacy Rule,3 which became final after a two-year
1 As defined in a 2006 Executive Order issued by President
Bush, the term ‘‘interoperability’’ means ‘‘. . .the ability to com-
municate and exchange data accurately, effectively, securely,
and consistently with different information technology sys-
tems, software applications, and networks in various settings,
and exchange data such that clinical or operational purpose
and meaning of data are preserved and unaltered.’’ Executive
Order: Promoting Quality and Efficient Health Care in Federal
Government Administered or Sponsored Health Care Pro-
grams, (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060822-2.html
(Accessed Nov. 8, 2006).
2 See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Construc-
tion, and Application of Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations Promul-
gated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133 (2004).
3 DHHS issued a proposed Privacy Rule for public comment
on Nov. 3, 1999, and, after receiving and responding to more
than 52,000 comments, issued a final Privacy Rule on Dec. 28,
2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 82462). After the new Bush administration
took office, in March, 2002, DHHS proposed and released for
public comment modifications to the final Privacy Rule. After
reviewing the additional 11,000 comments, modifications were
published in final form on Aug. 14, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 53182).
An unofficial version of the HIPAA Administrative Simplifica-
tion Regulation Text, 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164, as
amended through Feb. 16, 2006 (which includes the current
version of both the Privacy and Security Rules) is available at
http://dhhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/finalreg.html (Accessed Nov. 22,
2006).
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transitional compliance period.4 The Rule is primarily
enforced by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
Having overcome a series of legal challenges, the Pri-
vacy Rule today provides a basic national legal frame-
work for patient health information privacy.5
Under the HIPAA framework, protected health infor-
mation (PHI) is specifically defined and generally pro-
tected.6 At the same time, however, PHI can be dis-
closed and transmitted through secure and interoper-
able electronic systems for a number of federally
defined purposes, including treatment, payment, and
health care operations, without written patient authori-
zation.7 Aggregated and de-identified health informa-
tion also can be used in a variety of ways that advance
public understanding of the quality of health care and
the process of quality improvement.8 In addition, the
Privacy Rule specifies a number of ‘‘public health and
benefit activities’’ that permit access to PHI by public
health and public safety agencies, without written pa-
tient authorization and in clearly defined circum-
stances.9 Sanctions can be imposed by the federal gov-
ernment for Privacy Rule violations,10 but the law cre-
ates no private right of action for individuals to enforce
federal protections or redress potential privacy viola-
tions.11
As with most laws grafted onto a complex and pre-
existing legal field, the HIPAA Privacy Rule functions as
part of a broad body of law governing information pri-
vacy.12 Indeed, health information privacy is one of the
premier examples of the nation’s intricate federal legal
framework, blending together centuries-old judicial
common law traditions with federal and state constitu-
tional provisions and statutory law.13 The HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule is simply the latest and best-known arrival on
the privacy law scene.
The sheer breadth and scope of health information
law obviously can create legal uncertainty, a phenom-
enon that the health care system has lived with for de-
cades. To begin to reduce some of this uncertainty and
to foster greater uniformity, HIPAA essentially estab-
lishes a roadmap toward reconciling the legal diversity
in the health information arena. This roadmap operates
as follows: HIPAA generally preempts state laws that
are ‘‘contrary to’’ its standards. At the same time, the
law also specifies that HIPAA privacy standards do:
not supersede a contrary provision of state law, if the
provision of state law imposes requirements, stan-
dards, or implementation specifications that are more
stringent than the requirements, standards, or imple-
mentation specifications imposed under the regula-
tion.14 [emphasis added].
This legislative structure thus establishes a standard
for determining when federal HIPAA standards are pre-
emptive (i.e., when its standards take precedence over
state law) and when they are not. Unlike the better-
known and broader preemption provisions found in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
HIPAA does not simply sweep away all state laws that
may somehow ‘‘relate to’’ the subject matter addressed
by HIPAA.15 Instead, HIPAA preempts only those state
laws that are ‘‘contrary to’’ federal health information
privacy standards, while preserving more protective
state laws that may exist. Put another way, HIPAA es-
tablishes a federal floor, but not a federal ceiling, on
personal health information privacy law. This approach
to preemption has been upheld as a valid exercise of
Congress’s commerce clause powers and as not uncon-
stitutionally vague.16
Revisiting HIPAA Preemption as Part of Health
Information Technology Adoption Initiatives
Over the past decade, as interest has intensified in
the creation of interoperable health information sys-
tems that can improve the quality of information and
create greater information transparency, both public
and private policymakers increasingly have focused on
the actual and perceived legal barriers to achieving
such a goal. Among the numerous actual and perceived
legal barriers attracting policymakers’ attention17 have
been possible barriers associated with the diffusion and
uses of health information technology, including the
adoption of the technology and its various uses.
In some cases, careful examination of the law has
shown evidence of a possible, actual legal barrier, and
steps have been taken to remove the barrier. A good ex-
ample of this phenomenon is Congress’s decision in
2003 (followed by HHS implementation two years later)
of special ‘‘safe harbors’’ to protect the sharing of
health information technology under certain circum-
stances.18
4 ‘‘Covered entities’’ were required to comply by April 14,
2003. Small health plans were given an additional year to com-
ply (April 14, 2004).
5 See Association of American Physicians and Surgeons,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 224
F. Supp.2d 1115, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 711 (S.D. Tex. 2002), aff’d
without opinion, 67 Fed. Appx. 253 (5th Cir. 2003).
6 45 CFR § 160.103.
7 45 CFR § 164.502(a)(1)(ii) and 45 CFR § 164.506.
8 45 CFR § 164.512(b)
9 45 CFR § 164.512 (b)
10 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 and 6.
11 Although numerous federal district courts have rejected
the proposition that HIPAA created a private right of action al-
lowing individual suits to enforce the Privacy Rule, the first ap-
pellate decision affirming that principle recently was handed
down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See
Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006).
12 D. Solove, M. Rotenberg and P. Schwartz, Information
Privacy Law (Aspen Pub. 2006).
13 J. Hodge and K. Gostin, Challenging Themes in Ameri-
can Health Information Privacy, and the Public’s Health: His-
torical and Modern Assessments; 32 J.L. Med. And Ethics 670
(Winter, 2004) ; A.C. Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy (Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970); R.R. Faden, T.L.
Beauchamp, in collaboration with N.M.P. King, A History and
Theory of Informed Consent (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986).
14 In HIPAA, Congress added a new Section 1178(a) to Part
C of Title XI of the Social Security Act that addresses preemp-
tion by describing this relationship between federal and state
law. However, the most critical language addressing preemp-
tion in the privacy context is the language cited above in Sec-
tion 264(c)(2) of HIPAA itself and incorporated by reference in
new Section 1178(a)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act.
15 ERISA § 514(a).
16 See South Carolina Medical Ass’n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d
346 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 464 (U.S. 2003).
17 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., ‘‘Charting the Legal Environ-
ment of Health Information,’’ The Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation, 2005, available at http://www.healthinfolaw.org (Ac-
cessed Jan. 7, 2007).
18 For example, this legal problem was addressed (at least
in part) by recently finalized Stark and anti-kickback safe har-
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In other cases, research may show that legal barriers
are more perceived than real; in these situations, clari-
fication regarding how law should be applied to new
situations may help reduce perceived legal barriers to
the full and transparent use of health information. For
example, a recent analysis found no actual federal legal
barriers to the collection, analysis, and disclosure of ra-
cial and ethnic data in health care quality improvement,
and recommended the development of clear federal
guidance regarding the permissible uses and disclo-
sures of race and ethnicity data as part of broad quality
improvement efforts.19
In the area of interoperability and the full disclosure
of aggregated and de-identified performance data, law
once again has emerged as a perceived barrier. The ba-
sis for this concern is that more stringent state privacy
might somehow prohibit the sharing of health informa-
tion permitted by HIPAA or the use of such information
to develop appropriate public sources of information
about system performance.
This concern has led to recent federal legislative pro-
posals that would begin to move U.S. health informa-
tion law toward a more uniform and standardized vi-
sion of privacy. The legislation would accomplish this
goal by developing and implementing federal standards
to establish both a legal floor and ceiling on health in-
formation privacy. This movement toward uniformity of
health information privacy law can be seen in the two
leading measures considered but not enacted during
the 109th Congress: the ‘‘Wired for Health Care Quality
Act,’’ (S. 1418)20 which passed the Senate in November
2005; and the ‘‘Health IT Promotion Act,’’ (H.R. 4157),21
which passed the House in 2006. Both pieces of legisla-
tion reflect a concern that the goals of uniform interop-
erability and transparency would somehow be incom-
patible with stricter state privacy laws.22
Thus, the Senate measure, in reaffirming the current
HIPAA preemption statute,23 also would have required
recommendations regarding uniform national policies
for the ‘‘protection of health information through pri-
vacy and security practices.’’24 The House bill similarly
reaffirmed the current HIPAA privacy standard while
also providing for a study of state privacy laws.25 The
House bill also required the HHS secretary to propose,
and Congress to consider, legislation ‘‘providing for
greater commonality’’ among federal and state law26 in
order:
to ensure the availability of health information neces-
sary to make medical decisions at the location in
which the medical care involved is provided. . . .
In this regard, the House measure reflects legislative
concern that state health information privacy law may
be acting as a barrier to the use and disclosure of health
information for quality and safety purposes and may
impair access to information at the point of service. To
the extent that state laws ultimately are determined to
pose such problems, the House legislation would en-
courage further legislative consideration of federal law
as a means of achieving ‘‘commonality.’’27
Indeed, a recently issued report by the GAO criticizes
DHHS for not moving more quickly to create a national
legal approach to privacy.28 The report presumably but-
tresses the view of the congressional supporters of a na-
tional privacy standard. Yet both the congressional sup-
porters and the GAO appear to presume the validity of
the concerns expressed by representatives of various
bor regulations. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 45110 (anti-kickback safe
harbors) and at 45140 (Stark exceptions) (Aug. 8, 2006), effec-
tive Oct. 10, 2006.
19 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., ‘‘The Legality of Collecting
and Disclosing Patient Race and Ethnicity Data,’’ The Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation, 2006, available at http://
www.healthinfolaw.org (Accessed Jan. 7, 2007).
20 The Senate bill, ‘‘Wired for Health Care Quality Act,’’
was sponsored by Sen. Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.).
21 The House bill, ‘‘Health IT Promotion Act,’’ was co-
sponsored by Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.) and Nathan Deal
(D-Ga.). The bill was marked up by both the Committee on
Ways and Means and the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce.
22 Health Information Technology: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, Statement of the Ameri-
can College of Physicians, 109th Cong. (April 6, 2006); Health
Information Technology: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, Statement of Don E. Detmer, M.D., presi-
dent and chief executive officer of the American Medical Infor-
matics Assn., 109th Cong. (July 27, 2005); Health Information
Technology: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, Statement of Allen Weiss, M.D., president of Naples,
Fla. Community Hospital Health Care Systems, 109th Cong.
(July 27, 2005); Health Information Technology: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Commerce Comm., Statement of Peter Basch,
M.D., 109th Cong. (June 30, 2005). Review of this testimony re-
flects the possibly widespread perception that HIPAA’s pre-
emption structure creates barriers to interoperability; yet de-
spite the fact that this concern is frequently asserted, evidence
to support the assertion has not been advanced. Similarly, a re-
cent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
criticizes the DHHS for not moving more quickly to create a
national legal approach to privacy, assuming, without citing
any evidentiary support apart from the statements made by
representatives of various interested parties, that the current
system of a federal HIPAA privacy floor supplemented by state
laws that are more stringent than HIPAA is a barrier to the cre-
ation of a nationwide interoperable system for heath informa-
tion exchange. Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Health In-
formation Technology: Early Efforts Initiated by Comprehen-
sive Privacy Approach Needed for National Strategy.’’ GAO-
07-238 (January 2007).
23 S. 1418 § 4: ‘‘Nothing in this title shall be construed to af-
fect the scope or substance of . . . section 264 of the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. . . .’’
24 S. 1418 § 2, as it passed the Senate, added a new Section
2903(c) to the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201, et
seq.).
25 H.R. 4157 § 102(2), as it passed the House.
26 H.R. 4157 § 205, as it passed the House.
27 In recent years the United States Supreme Court has
clarified Congress’s powers under the commerce clause to es-
tablish uniform requirements related to health care practice.
See e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (holding
that although the Attorney General had exceeded his power in
proscribing physician-assisted suicide under Oregon law, Con-
gress does have the constitutional power to regulate the prac-
tice of medicine); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), 125 S.
Ct. 2195 (concluding that even though plaintiff’s conduct was
completely intra-state and involved state-sanctioned medical
activities, the commerce clause nonetheless vests Congress
with the power to reach purely personal and intra-state con-
duct). See also George J. Annas, ‘‘Congress, Controlled Sub-
stances, and Physician-Assisted Suicide—Elephants in Mouse-
holes,’’ NEJM 354 1079-1084 (March 6, 2006); Lawrence O.
Gostin, POWER, DUTY, AND RESTRAINT. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003.
28 Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Health Information
Technology: Early Efforts Initiated by Comprehensive Privacy
Approach Needed for National Strategy.’’ GAO-07-238 (Janu-
ary 2007).
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interested parties that the current HIPAA preemption
structure poses a barrier to the creation of a nationwide
interoperable system for health information exchange,
even though an evidentiary basis for this proposition
has yet to be established.
Because of this congressional concern regarding the
potential effects of more stringent state laws on the de-
velopment of interoperable systems that also can pro-
duce a high and appropriate level of health information
transparency, this project was undertaken. Its purpose
was to analyze existing case law in the wake of the
HIPAA statute and ensuing Privacy Rule, to determine
the extent to which state privacy law may curtail the
proper flow of PHI for quality and safety purposes.
Study Methods
This analysis involves a systematic review of all re-
ported federal and state court cases decided between
1996 and 2006 involving the interpretation of state pri-
vacy law in relation to HIPAA. Although legal decisions
are far from the only means of measuring the possible
effects of law, judicial decisions represent a valuable
window onto the world in two respects; first as a source
of evidence about the existence of a problem, and sec-
ond, as evidence of how the health care system under-
stands the sources of powers and constraints within
which it operates.29
Lawyers with extensive experience in health law gen-
erally, and HIPAA in particular,30 undertook a legal
scan of all reported federal and state court decisions in
which the term ‘‘HIPAA’’ or ‘‘Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act’’ or ‘‘Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996’’ appeared. The
scan was conducted utilizing standard legal research
data bases and yielded 479 cases as of Nov. 21, 2006.
Each case that included any of these search terms at
least once was then examined and categorized in accor-
dance with a series of review criteria designed to deter-
mine the following: (a) the parties and the nature of the
underlying dispute; (b) whether the dispute involved
HIPAA preemption—that is, a conflict between the
HIPAA disclosure standard and an arguably ‘‘contrary’’
or ‘‘more stringent’’ state law; and (c) whether the court
addressed the ‘‘merits’’ of the HIPAA preemption claim
(i.e. whether the court in fact had to determine if the
state law was indeed ‘‘contrary’’ to or ‘‘more stringent’’
than the HIPAA disclosure standard).
The research team was especially interested in cases
in which ‘‘more stringent’’ state laws may have pre-
vented health care providers from obtaining access to
patient information at the point of service. For purposes
of our detailed analysis, the relevant cases were those
that involved the allegation of a conflict between HIPAA
and state law, thereby compelling a judicial preemption
analysis. These cases then were assessed for their re-
sults, which were tabulated in the aggregate and further
analyzed for their specific approach to the question of
HIPAA preemption and state law.
A total of 479 cases fell within the scope of the analy-
sis. The actual number of cases included in the subse-
quent preemption scan ultimately was reduced to 446
once duplication of decisions related to appeals and
case consolidations were taken into account. Of these
446 cases, 333 were discarded because they raised no
conflict between HIPAA and state law. Most of the dis-
carded cases presented the question of HIPAA’s consti-
tutionality, whether HIPAA afforded individuals a pri-
vate right of action to enforce HIPAA’s protections,31 or
whether the secretary possessed the authority to pro-
mulgate the Privacy Rule. The remaining discarded
cases addressed other sections of HIPAA not relevant to
this analysis.
The remaining 113 cases, in which a potential conflict
between HIPAA and state law was presented, then were
categorized by the case domain, the underlying claim,
the type of information sought, the types of entities in-
volved, and whether the court concluded that state law,
federal law, or both governed the dispute in light of the
facts and the nature of the state law at issue.
Findings
The Key Characteristics of HIPAA Preemption Cases
In General
The single most important finding to emerge from
this analysis is that to date, no HIPAA preemption case
involves an effort by a health care provider to remove a
state law barrier that is perceived as posing a barrier to
access to or use of health information at the point of
treatment. The implications and possible underlying
reasons for this finding, which appears to contradict a
central underlying assumption of the 2006 House legis-
lation (i.e., the potential for state laws to act as legal
barriers to provider access to patient safety and health
care quality information), will be discussed in the Con-
clusion.
Second, of nearly equal importance, the underlying
conflicts that appear to be driving disputes involving
the relationship between state laws and the HIPAA pri-
vacy rule appear to focus on the disgorgement of infor-
mation as part of the legal process rather the use of in-
formation to improve quality, reduce disparities or cre-
ate transparency. That is, the principal case domain is
a dispute regarding access to PHI as part of the legal
process, rather than its use to advance quality and
transparency. Indeed, because the operation of the legal
system functions as the principal case domain, covered
entities (including health care providers) are the most
common party to the dispute; their most common pos-
ture is as defendants invoking the HIPAA Privacy Rule
as a defense to a request for the disclosure of patient
data in liability lawsuits brought against them. In a
number of cases, health care providers may be in the
position of plaintiffs attempting to secure access to PHI
held by a non-patient third party.
Case Domains
The principal case domains are shown below in Fig-
ure 1.
Types of Underlying Claims
The relevant HIPAA cases concern many specific
types of underlying claims that relate to the use or dis-
29 William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health In-
surance Coverage: Trompe L’Oeil or Window on the World? 31
Ind. Law Rev. 4972 (1998).
30 Professor Phyllis C. Borzi, one of the lawyers involved in
this review, was under contract with the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services during 1999 and 2000, to
assist in evaluating the public comments on the proposed Pri-
vacy Rule and examining policy and legal options that led to
the promulgation of the final HIPAA rule in 2000.
31 HIPAA does not provide for a private right of action. See
Acara, supra note 10.
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closure of health information within the operation of
the legal process. Figure 2 underscores the rich array of
legal claims in which access to health information is
sought for a variety of reasons and becomes central to
the dispute.
Types of Covered Entities Involved in HIPAA
Preemption Cases
Because they possess the PHI at issue, or seek the
PHI for defensive purposes in malpractice cases, cov-
ered entities always will be involved in the Privacy Rule
cases in some capacity. Although not always an actual
litigant in the dispute, the covered entity, at the very
least, is awaiting judicial direction as to the disposition
of the PHI it possesses. Figure 3 illustrates both the
types of covered entities holding the PHI at issue, as
well as whether the covered entity is seeking to with-
hold, disclose, or obtain the PHI (for a malpractice de-
fense). Consistent with our finding that the legal pro-
cess is the principal domain for HIPAA preemption
cases, Figure 3 shows that the most common case sce-
nario involves a health care provider attempting to
shield information that he or she possess from legal ac-
cess by the patient or a third party. The most common
plaintiffs are not other providers attempting to secure
access to health information for use at the point of care,
but instead, private individuals, health insurers, provid-
ers defending against malpractice, or federal and state
public agencies that seek information for reasons re-
lated to their underlying claims.
Types of Information Sought
Figure 4 illustrates the broad array of information or
PHI that HIPAA cases may involve. By far, the most
common type of information is the medical record it-
self, but often the information concerns evidence from
non-treating physicians during the course of litigation,
such as depositions and non-treating physician commu-
nications.
Careful reading of the preemption cases indicates
that courts already are actively engaged in an effort to
reconcile federal and state law in order to give life to
the HIPAA legislative ‘‘roadmap.’’
The vast majority of HIPAA cases involve the operation of a
state’s legal process rather than efforts to improve health
care quality through access to protected information.
The HIPAA preemption cases largely involve access
to PHI as part of civil actions, through court-supervised
discovery as well as part of government or insurance in-
vestigations. A fair number of cases also involve crimi-
nal prosecutions under state or federal law. HIPAA pre-
emption analysis comes into play most directly as
courts attempt to reconcile HIPAA’s standards with
state law standards related to the status and disclosure
of evidence in legal proceedings; in other words, at its
core, the typical preemption case involves the judicial
determination of whether HIPAA alters state law stan-
dards governing the disclosure of PHI as part of the le-
gal process.
For example, courts have concluded that HIPAA does
not create a new federal substantive right that would
protect PHI from disclosure in the normal course of
business (i.e., does not create a new, federal physician/
patient privilege). Instead, courts find that HIPAA’s im-
pact is to establish specific procedural steps that cov-
ered entities must follow in order to use and/or disclose
PHI, or more typically, to justify withholding disclosure
of such information.32
32 See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 2006 WL 2831035 (D.
Me. Oct. 3, 2006); Abbott v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation, 2006 WL 2504417 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug.
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Judicial decisions involving HIPAA preemption es-
sentially can be summarized as follows: notwithstand-
ing the widely held perception that HIPAA creates fed-
eral disclosure barriers, HIPAA allows entities to set
disclosure policies that advance health care quality and
transparency and ensure conformance to state disclo-
sure law. The court decisions underscore that not only
do covered entities fail to use the flexibility they possess
under HIPAA, but even more strikingly, that covered
entities do not understand the practical operation of
HIPAA.
A Closer Look at the HIPAA Preemption Decisions
In a typical case scenario, the covered entity holding
PHI is confronted with a request or demand for PHI.
The covered entity then faces three basic questions un-
der the Privacy Rule: (1) must the PHI be disclosed; (2)
may the PHI be disclosed; and (3) is disclosing the PHI
prohibited?
Taken together, the decisions underscore the great
degree of flexibility accorded covered entities under
HIPAA where disclosure of PHI is concerned. More im-
portantly, our review of the existing HIPAA decisions under-
scores the absence of cases in which a more stringent
state law stops a provider disclosure for patient care pur-
poses.
Interestingly, and particularly important for preemp-
tion purposes, a clear trend emerges in the cases to-
ward reconciliation of state and federal law in order to
avoid precisely the types of conflicts that would unduly
burden data exchange. Instead of treating HIPAA and
state law as conflicting, the courts overwhelmingly inter-
pret HIPAA so as to enable covered entities to comply with
both bodies of law.
HIPAA’s rules for disclosure can be classified into
two basic categories—required and permitted33—and as
part of their preemption analysis, the courts focus on
applying these two types of disclosures, even if the cov-
ered entity has ignored, or appears not to understand,
them.
Figure 5 summarizes HIPAA’s disclosure standards.
The HIPAA preemption cases, taken together, sug-
gest that by far, the most confusing category of disclo-
sures involve permitted disclosures which are ‘‘required
by law’’ (these include disclosures of PHI required by a
state or federal statute, regulation or by a court order).
The confusion relates to the fact that even though the
disclosure is required by state law, HIPAA permits the en-
tity to decide whether it will comply with state law without
first obtaining patient authorization. In other words, a cov-
ered entity has the power to invoke HIPAA’s federal privacy
floor to preempt a state statute mandating disclosure. As a
matter of state law, disclosure is required. As a matter of
HIPAA, disclosure is permissive.
HIPAA requires covered entities to adopt written
policies and procedures as part of their compliance
standards. 34 These policies must explain a covered en-
tity’s approach to permitted disclosures. In their deci-
sions, courts do not dwell on (or typically even men-
tion) whether the entity has in fact complied with this
HIPAA requirement that the covered entity must have a
written disclosure policy, instead they focus on whether
the disclosure is required under HIPAA.
In reviewing the HIPAA preemption cases, we found no
cases in which the demand for disclosure involved
treatment or payment.
Instead, the cases involve disclosure demands related
to the situations shown in Figure 2 — demands for infor-
mation as part of the legal process. The cases involve
30, 2006); Findley v. Findley, 937 So.2d 912 (La. Ct. App.
2006); Gendal v. Billotti, 2006 WL 2135525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July
31, 2006); State v. Siegel, 136 P.3d 1214 (Or. Ct. App. June 16,
2006); Bihm v. Bihm, 932 So.2d 732 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Boyd
v. City and County of San Francisco, 2006 WL 1390423 (N.D.
Cal. May 18, 2006); Sanders v. St. Charles Hosp. and Rehabili-
tation, 820 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Richter v. Mu-
tual of Omaha Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1277906 (E.D. Wis. May 5,
2006); Anderson v. City of New York, 2006 WL 1134117
(E.D.N.Y. April 28, 2006); Rice v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
2006 WL 1128223 (D. Idaho April 26, 2006); Giangiulio v. In-
galls Memorial Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. 2006); Rosales
v. City of Bakersfield, 2006 WL 988605 (E.D. Cal. April 13,
2006); Armstrong v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2006 WL
1045709 (Ky. Ct. App. March 31, 2006); State ex rel. Cincinnati
Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2006); In re Stuart
G., 820 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2006); Sunrise Opportuni-
ties, Inc. v. Regier, 2006 WL 581150 (N.D. Ill. March 7, 2006);
Massaro v. Massaro, 2006 WL 350065 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
Feb. 17, 2006).
33 45 CFR § 164.502(a) et seq. 34 45 CFR § 164.530(i)(1).
Figure 4
Type of Information Sought in HIPAA Cases
911 tapes 1
Deposition of non-party treating physician 1
Ex-parte communication with non-party treating physician
of the plaintiff 28
Financial records and tax returns of treating physicians 1
HIV status of a prisoner 1
Informed consent and participant questionnaires from
participants in medical device clinical trials 1
Insurance records 2
Lead citations issued to property owners 1
Medicaid claims documents that include PHI 1
Medical information in employee personnel file 1
Medical record 52
Medicare billing and refund records 1
Mental hospital commitment records 1
Names and addresses of other patient-witnesses 5
Name, justification, type of coverage, and claims history
for all people receiving city health benefits 1
Paramedic’s testimony re defendant’s statements made
in the course of providing health care treatment 1
Patient scheduling information 2
Positive results of employee’s drug test administered by
employer state agency 1
Results of a compulsory medical exam for police officers 1
Statements made to nurses during the course of
treatment 1
Statistics regarding allegations of patient abuse at state-
run mental health facilities 1
Triage time, treatment time, and triage designations for
non-party ER patients 1
NA 7
Total Cases 113
Source: GWU DHP HIPAA Case Law Database, 11/21/06
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demands for information under a state or federal law, in
which a determination must be made as to whether
HIPAA permits, requires, or prohibits the disclosure.
Even though the disclosure of PHI in the particular situ-
ation at issue may be ‘‘required by law,’’ under HIPAA’s
structure, the disclosure remains permissive with the
covered entity.35 Virtually every case we examined in-
volved a permitted disclosure under HIPAA, thus illus-
trating the little-acknowledged fact that HIPAA leaves
covered entities with enormous control over informa-
tion flow, even in legal disclosure cases.
Practically speaking, however, while HIPAA may ap-
pear to allow covered entities to decide whether or not
they will comply with other requirements of law be-
cause HIPAA classifies the ‘‘required by law’’ disclosure
as permitted, in reality, covered entities that ignore
state law requirements do so at their peril. Perhaps it
would have been more sensible for the secretary in
crafting the HIPAA Privacy Rule to classify these legally
required disclosures as ‘‘required,’’ but the courts have
approached this conundrum by simply noting that noth-
ing in HIPAA precludes the covered entity from comply-
ing with both HIPAA and state law. And in most in-
stances, the court leaves the decision of how to recon-
cile any potential problem with the covered entity,
rather than ordering the covered entity to take a par-
ticular action.
Ironically perhaps, most of the cases involved health
care professionals and institutions that, as covered enti-
ties, attempted either to block a disclosure or to secure
disclosure from other covered entities in situations not
involving either treatment or payment. Thus, the heart
of the judicial analysis becomes whether HIPAA allows
a health care provider to shield the information, even
though the relevant state or federal law under which the
information is sought is one couched in ‘‘required by
law’’ terms. The fact that HIPAA’s most common use
may be by covered entities attempting to shield infor-
mation is somewhat ironic in view of concern on the
part of some policymakers that HIPAA’s tolerance of
state privacy law would prevent providers from secur-
ing information critical to treatment decisions.
Thus, it would appear that HIPAA’s most important
contribution to the flow of personal health information
may lie in the fact that HIPAA empowers covered enti-
ties to withhold information whose disclosure previ-
ously would have been required by law. In these cases,
the HIPAA privacy ‘‘floor’’ effectively ensures that, at a
covered entity’s election, HIPAA can be used to create a
shield that can withstand state legal disclosure statutes.
Put another way, the overwhelming majority of HIPAA
preemption cases involve efforts to reconcile the HIPAA
privacy floor with ‘‘contrary’’ state statutes that require
disclosure, rather than efforts to reconcile HIPAA’s pri-
vacy floor with ‘‘more stringent’’ state privacy laws.
HIPAA gives covered entities a great deal of power to
determine whether they will comply with state disclo-
sure statutes, and covered entities have the power to de-
termine if they will conform their disclosure policies to
the laws of the state in which they operate. In these
cases, rather than ordering a disclosure, the courts sim-
ply point out that the covered entity in question faces no
35 As previously noted, the covered entity must adopt poli-
cies and procedures regarding permitted disclosures, includ-
ing which permitted disclosures it will allow and under what
circumstances. Despite this HIPAA requirement, the courts
have yet to penalize covered entities for failure to adopt a
policy. Instead, the courts seem to assume that all permitted
disclosures allowed under HIPAA apply to all requests for PHI.
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barrier in complying with the state law, thereby recon-
ciling the HIPAA floor with state disclosure law.36
Courts rarely find HIPAA preemption of state laws that are
‘‘contrary to’’ the HIPAA privacy floor and instead focus on
the discretionary power of covered entities to disclose
information.
The heart of a HIPAA preemption analysis is a deter-
mination of whether state law is ‘‘contrary to’’ HIPAA
and thus preempted, or whether the state law is
‘‘saved’’ (in ERISA parlance) because it is ‘‘more strin-
gent’’ than the HIPAA floor.37 Figure 6 underscores how
few cases actually involve either of these two catego-
ries. Only 13 of the 113 cases reviewed involved judicial
consideration of allegedly ‘‘more stringent’’ state law.
Twenty-nine cases38 have squarely addressed the
question of whether a state law is preempted by HIPAA.
Of most significance are those cases dealing with dis-
covery disputes about what type of information can be
used in a trial.
For example, when state laws require individuals
who file a malpractice action to execute a broad release
of their personal medical records upon filing, some
courts have held that such laws are ‘‘contrary to’’
HIPAA and thus preempted because HIPAA includes a
very specific and detailed list of requirements that must
be included in any valid authorization for the release of
PHI to a third party.39 These cases generally stand for
the proposition that HIPAA’s more protective patient
authorization requirements will govern in the face of
sweeping state laws that mandate broad release of per-
sonal health information in a malpractice litigation con-
text.
A related set of cases deals with state laws that ad-
dress the informal ex-parte communications of defense
counsel with plaintiff’s treating physicians who are not
themselves involved in the malpractice litigation. Some
courts have determined that such contact is not allowed
because HIPAA is more restrictive;40 other courts have
36 See Abbott v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, 2006 WL 2504417 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 30,
2006); Sanders v. St. Charles Hosp. and Rehabilitation, 820
N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Anderson v. City of New
York, 2006 WL 1134117 (E.D.N.Y. April 28, 2006); Rosales v.
City of Bakersfield, 2006 WL 988605 (E.D. Cal. April 13, 2006);
Armstrong v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2006 WL 1045709
(Ky. Ct. App. March 31, 2006); State ex rel. Cincinnati En-
quirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2006); Massaro v.
Massaro, 2006 WL 350065 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Feb. 17,
2006); Clancey v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2005 WL 2222193
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2005); In re Involuntary Termination of
Parent Child Relationship of A.H., L.H., C.H., and J.H, 832
N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Raynor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.
and Medical Center, 801 N.Y.S.2d 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005);
Ohio Legal Rights Service v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365
F. Supp.2d 877 (S.D. Ohio April 2005).
37 On its Web site, DHHS’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR),
which is charged with interpreting and administering HIPAA’s
Privacy Rule, describes in both its summary of the Rule and in
its Frequently Asked Questions what it means for a state law
to be ‘‘more stringent’’ than HIPAA. For instance, Question
#405 explains that the Privacy Rule establishes a floor of fed-
eral protections and that if state law provides greater privacy
protections for patients, state law is not preempted, even if it
would appear to be ‘‘contrary to’’ HIPAA. Among the examples
cited by OCR are those involving state laws prohibiting disclo-
sure of an individual’s HIV status. Although HIPAA permits
such disclosure in certain circumstances, OCR says there is no
onflict between the state law and HIPAA and therefore no pre-
emption of state law because the ‘‘more stringent’’ state law
would prevail.
38 See Hulse v. Suburban Mobile Home Supply Company,
2006 WL 2927519 (D. Kan. Oct. 12, 2006); Griffin v. Burden,
2006 WL 2567223 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2006); Crisp Regional
Hosp., Inc. v. Sanders, 2006 WL 2507153 (Ga. Ct. App. Aug. 31,
2006); Brazier v. Crockett Hosp., 2006 WL 2040408 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 20, 2006); Allen v. Wright, 2006 WL 1976762 (Ga. Ct.
App. July 14, 2006); Northlake Medical Center, LLC v. Queen,
634 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Constantino v. North
Shore University Hosp., 820 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006);
Fisher v. Yale University, 2006 WL 1075035 (Conn. Super. Ct.
April 3, 2006); State v. Downs, 923 So.2d 726 (La. Ct. App.
2005); Harmon v. Maury County, TN, 2005 WL 2133697 (M.D.
Tenn. Aug. 31, 2005); Travis v. Thane International, Inc., 2005
WL 1971900, (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2005); Michelson v. Wyatt,
880 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2005); Alsip v. Johnson
City Medical Center, 2005 WL 1536192 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
30, 2005); In re Diet Drug Litigation, 895 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2005); Valli v. Viviani, 801 N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2005); Croskey v. BMW of North America, Inc., 2005
WL 1959452 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2005.); Bayne v. Provost, 359
F. Supp.2d 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Creely v. Genesis Health Ven-
tures, Inc., 2004 WL 2943661 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2004);
Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, 785 N.Y.S2d 300
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); Hawes v. Golden, 2004 WL 2244448
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2004); Crenshaw v. Mony Life Insur-
ance Co., 318 F. Supp.2d 1015 (S.D. Ca. 2004); Law v. Zucker-
man, 307 F. Supp.2d 705 (D. Md. 2004); Smith v. American
Home Products Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceutical, 855 A.2d
608 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003); Tapp v. State, 108 S.W.3d 459 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Houston 2003); U.S. ex re. Stewart v. Louisiana
Clinic, 2002 WL 31819130 (E.D. La. December 12, 2002);
O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 173
F. Supp.2d 1176 (D. Wyo. 2001); Cowan v. Combined Ins. Co.
of America, 67 F. Supp.2d 1312 (M.D. Ala. 1999); M.P. Means
v. Independent Life and Accident Insurance Co., 963 F. Supp.
1131 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Wright v. Combined Insurance Co. of
America, 959 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Miss. 1997).
39 See Griffin v. Burden, 2006 WL 2567223 (Ga.App. Sept.
7, 2006); Crisp Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Sanders, 2006 WL
2507153 (Ga.App. August 31, 2006); Allen v. Wright, 2006 WL
1976762 (Ga.App. July 14. 2006); Northlake Medical Center,
LLC v. Queen, 2006 WL 1914716 (Ga.App. July 13, 2006). See
45 CFR § 164.508(b) for the HIPAA requirements for a valid
authorization.
40 See Allen v. Wright, 2006 WL 1976762 (Ga.App. July 14,
2006); Travis v. Thane International, Inc., 2005 WL 1971900,
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determined that the practice may continue because a
covered entity (the physicians) can comply with both
the state law and HIPAA.41 In those latter cases, the
court may order the non-party treating physician to dis-
close PHI with certain restrictions (since it would be a
permitted disclosure under HIPAA for participation in
legal proceedings), even though the physician, as a
HIPAA-covered entity, may not have adopted a policy
regarding such disclosure. Alternatively, the court sim-
ply may remind the non-party physician that disclosure
of PHI in this context is permitted under HIPAA, and
leave it to the physician to determine whether or not to
communicate with defense counsel.42
Courts permit ‘‘more stringent’’ state laws to survive
preemption.
In only13 43 out of the 113 cases has the issue been
whether a state law is ‘‘more stringent’’ than HIPAA
and thus capable of surviving preemption. Again, most
of these cases arise in the discovery context and focus
on whether certain PHI—usually found in the patient’s
medical record—is admissible at trial. In some cases,
the covered entity holding PHI may want to introduce
the medical record in defense of a malpractice claim; in
others, the covered entity wants to avoid producing PHI
in the court proceeding, arguing that production vio-
lates the state physician/patient privilege law. Some
courts have held that state laws governing the
physician/patient privilege are ‘‘more stringent’’ than
HIPAA and thus can be enforced because they override
the HIPAA permitted use provisions.44 In other cases,
however, the courts have concluded that the more strin-
gent state law can live in harmony with HIPAA.45 In
these cases, courts, rather than counseling the covered
entity holding PHI to adopt a disclosure policy permit-
ting the disclosure, simply shift the decision of whether
or not to disclose back to the covered entity or alterna-
tively, issue an order directing disclosure.
The ‘‘as required by law’’ cases illustrate how the courts
are reconciling the HIPAA privacy floor with state
disclosure laws.
Thirty-six cases have addressed what happens when
a covered entity seeks to disclose (or is asked to dis-
close) PHI pursuant to a law other than HIPAA, under
HIPAA’s ‘‘as required by law’’ permitted use.46 These
cases also illustrate the means by which courts con-
clude that both state laws and HIPAA can co-exist. For
requests for public information, some courts have held
the covered entity may disclose PHI pursuant to a state
(M.D.Tenn. Aug. 15, 2005) (although court did allow admit-
tance of this evidence because the patient had authorized it);
Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 2005 WL 1536192
(Tenn.Ct.App. June 30, 2005); Croskey v. BMW of North
America, Inc., 2005 WL 1959452 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2005);
Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp.2d 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2005);
Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, 785 N.Y.S2d 300 (NY
Sup. Ct. 2004); Crenshaw v. Mony Life Insurance Co., 318
F. Supp.2d 1015 (S.D. Ca. 2004); Law v. Zuckerman, 307
F. Supp.2d 705 (D. Md. 2004).
41 See Hulse v. Suburban Mobile Home Supply Co., 2006
WL 2927519 (D. Kansas Oct. 12, 2006); In re Diet Drug Litiga-
tion, 895 A.2d 493 (N.J.Super.L. 2005); Valli v. Viviani, 801
N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y.Sup. 2005); Smith v. American Home Prod-
ucts Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceutical, 855 A.2d 608 (NJ
Sup. Ct 2003).
42 See Hitchcock v. Suddaby, 801 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2005); Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, 785
N.Y.S2d 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
43 See Findley v. Findley, 937 So.2d 912 (La. Ct. App. 2006);
Bihm v. Bihm, 932 So.2d 732 (La. Ct. App. 2006); QT, Inc. v.
Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, 2006 WL 1371426 (N.D. Ill. May 15,
2006); Giangiulio v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249
(Ill. App. 2006); Ottinger v. Mausner, 816 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2006); Grove v. Northeast Ohio Nephrology Assoc.,
Inc., 844 N.E.2d 400 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Citizens for Health
v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2005); Belote v. Strange, 2005
WL 2758007 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005); In re Berg, 886
A.2d 980 (N.H. 2005); Y.J.K. v. D.A., 2005 WL 2220021 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2005); Moss v. Amira, 826 N.E.2d 1001 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005); Michota v. Bayfront Medical Center, Inc., 2005
WL 900771 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2005); United States v. Dia-
betes Treatment Centers of America, 2004 WL 2009416 (D.
D.C. May 17, 2004).
44 See Giangiulio v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249
(Ill.App. 2006); Bihm v. Bihm, 2006 WL 1479802 (La.App. 3
Cir. May 31, 2006); Ottinger v. Mausner, 816 N.Y.S.2d 698
(N.Y.Sup. 2006); Grove v. Northeast Ohio Nephrology Assoc.,
Inc., 844 N.E.2d 400 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 2005); Y.J.K. v. D.A.,
2005 WL 2220021 (D.C. Super. Sept. 9, 2005).
45 See Findley v. Findley, 2006 WL 2393129 (La.App. Aug.
16, 2006); Belote v. Strange, 2005 WL 2758007 (Mich.App. Oct.
25, 2005); In re Berg, 886 A.2d 980 (N.H. 2005); Moss v. Amira,
826 N.E.2d 1001 (Ill.App.2005).
46 See Abbott v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, 2006 WL 2504417 (Tex. App.-Austin August 30,
2006); State v. Siegel, 136 P.3d 1214 (Or. Ct. App. June 16,
2006); Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, 2006 WL
1390423 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006); Rodriguez v. Folksamerica
Reinsurance Co., 2006 WL 1359119 (D. Conn. May 15, 2006);
Sanders v. St. Charles Hosp. and Rehabilitation, 820 N.Y.S.2d
846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Richter v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
2006 WL 1277906 (E.D. Wis. May 5, 2006); Anderson v. City of
New York, 2006 WL 1134117 (E.D.N.Y. April 28, 2006); Rice v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1128223 (D. Idaho April
26, 2006); Coffie v. City of Chicago, 2006 WL 1069132 (N.D. Ill.
April 21, 2006); Rosales v. City of Bakersfield, 2006 WL 988605
(E.D. Cal. April 13, 2006); Armstrong v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky, 2006 WL 1045709 (Ky. Ct. App. March 31, 2006);
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181
(Ohio 2006); Massaro v. Massaro, 2006 WL 350065 (N.J. Su-
per. App. Div. Feb. 17, 2006); U.S. v. Zamora, 408 F. Supp.2d
295, 298 (S.D.Tex. 2006); Protection & Advocacy System, Inc.
v. Freudenthal, 412 F. Supp.2d 1211 (D. Wyo. 2006); In re Es-
tate of Broderick, 125 P.3d 564 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005); U.S. v. W.
R. Grace, 401 F. Supp.2d 1093 (D. Mont. 2005); U.S. ex rel.
Kaplan v. Metropolitan Ambulance & First-Aid Corp., 395
F. Supp.2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Clancey v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 2005 WL 2222193 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2005); Tomc-
zak v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 834 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005); In re Involuntary Termination of Parent Child Relation-
ship of A.H., L.H., C.H., and J.H, 832 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); In re MacLeman, 808 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005);
U.S. v. Mathis, 377 F. Supp.2d 640 (M.D.Tenn. 2005); Com-
monwealth v. Pratt, 2005 WL 1459650 (Mass. Super. Ct. June
9, 2005); Carpenter v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 2005
WL 1476542 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 12, 2005); Hitchcock v.
Suddaby, 801 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Raynor v. St.
Vincent’s Hosp. and Medical Center, 801 N.Y.S.2d 241 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2005); Fliegelman v. Stamford Health System, Inc.,
2005 WL 1273887 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 27, 2005); Ohio Le-
gal Rights Service v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365 F. Supp.2d 877
(S.D. Ohio April 2005); Chapman v. Health and Hospitals Cor-
porations, 796 N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Smith v.
Rafalin, 800 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Webdale v.
North General Hosp., 796 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005);
McGuire v. Rawlings Co., LLC. 2005 WL 895870 (Conn. Super.
Ct. March 14, 2005); Girard v. Girard, 2005 WL 704366 (Conn.
Super. Ct. February 10, 2005); Steele v. Clifton Springs Hosp.
and Clinic, 788 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); In re Will of
Ettinger, 793 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005).
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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request and that
HIPAA does not present a bar to disclosure.47 However,
when the state law itself prohibits disclosure through an
exception to its FOIA, both HIPAA and the state law op-
erate together to deny the release of PHI.48 HIPAA has
not been an obstacle to disclosure under state manda-
tory disclosure laws, since this form of compliance is
permitted under several HIPAA provisions.49
The majority of cases that deal with the ‘‘as required
by law’’ test permit disclosure under HIPAA. These
cases serve to illustrate the frequency with which cov-
ered entities may simply be unsure about what to do in
the face of a court order, subpoena, or other discovery
request when PHI is sought to be used at trial as evi-
dence. Inevitably, the party seeking to use the informa-
tion to its benefit argues that the covered entity may re-
lease PHI pursuant to HIPAA’s ‘‘as required by law’’
provisions for use in ‘‘judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings’’ or for ‘‘law enforcement purposes.’’ Courts
generally have held in these situations that the covered
entity may disclose the PHI under this permitted use, so
long as the HIPAA safeguards—such as notice to the
patient and an accompanying protective order limiting
the release—are in place and there exists no more strin-
gent state law on the issue.50
Courts view HIPAA as creating a disclosure protocol for
PHI, not a substantive physician/patient privilege.
As noted, the courts are consistent in their view that
HIPAA did not create a federal physician/patient privi-
lege, and most are in agreement that HIPAA generally
creates a process for determining legal uses and disclo-
sures of PHI, not substantive evidentiary rights.51 These
conclusions have led some courts, in evaluating the le-
gal effect of HIPAA preemption, to confront the follow-
ing question: in a federal case involving federal claims
brought in federal court pursuant to the federal rules of
evidence, must ‘‘more stringent’’ state evidentiary laws
apply in a solely federal context as a result of the
HIPAA preemption rule? Termed ‘‘reverse preemption’’
by the courts, a clear trend is emerging that denies ap-
plicability of state evidentiary laws even if arguably
more stringent than HIPAA, when the suit involves en-
forcement of federal law. As one court described it, ‘‘the
HIPAA regulations do not impose state evidentiary
privileges on suits to enforce federal law.’’52 The cases
further illustrate judicial reconciliation of HIPAA with
other law, both state and federal: stricter state laws will
be applicable in state cases while HIPAA will apply
without interference from state evidentiary law in the
federal domain.
Conclusion
This analysis explores how the legal system grapples
with the introduction of federal rules governing the pro-
tection, management, and disclosure of personal health
information. Nearly 500 cases related to HIPAA have
been litigated since its enactment, and 113 of these
cases focus on the important question of how HIPAA’s
federal standards are to be squared with both state law
and with other federal laws. Only 13 cases involve rec-
onciling the HIPAA disclosure provisions with more
stringent state laws. Most cases involve the application
of HIPAA and state privacy laws to the question of PHI
in the legal process. There is no evidence from the case
law that either HIPAA or state privacy laws act as barriers
either to the disclosure of health information essential to
health care quality or to the use of such information to cre-
ate transparent health care quality information through ag-
gregated and de-identified health information.
The sheer volume of litigation focusing on HIPAA’s
interface with the legal process probably will come as
no surprise to those who are familiar with the legal pro-
cess or HIPAA. Health care is a field driven by law and
adversarial proceedings. Health information is and al-
ways has been a basic byproduct and pillar of health
care and health information is integral to the legal pro-
cess. Because the disposition of countless claims turns
on the consideration of medical evidence—much of it
‘‘PHI’’ as the term is used in HIPAA—litigation involv-
ing the meaning of HIPAA in relation to state law is in-
evitable.
A close examination of the 113 HIPAA Privacy Rule
cases decided as of the end of 2006 in which decisions
on the merits were reached supports several basic con-
clusions:
First, the cases overwhelmingly focus on HIPAA’s ef-
fect on the use of PHI in the legal process itself. Few
cases present conflicts between HIPAA and more strin-
gent state laws. None of the cases involve the impact of
more stringent state laws on efforts by health care pro-
viders to secure information essential for treating pa-
tients. Indeed, a common litigation posture is that of
provider as a covered entity attempting to use HIPAA as
either a sword or a shield: either to prevent disclosure
of PHI or to gain access to it to defend against malprac-
tice. In either scenario, the analysis is the same: can
state law be reconciled with HIPAA’s permitted disclo-
sure provisions?
Second, examination of the judicial process at work
in the HIPAA cases underscores a clear desire on the
part of the courts to reconcile state disclosure laws with
HIPAA privacy safeguards. Ironically, the key to recon-
ciling HIPAA and state law is that in most of the cases,
the disclosure at issue is one that is permitted, but not
47 See Abbott v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, 2006 WL 2504417 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug. 30,
2006); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d
1181 (Ohio 2006).
48 See Hill v. East Baton Rouge Parish Dept. of Emergency
Medical Services, 925 So.2d 17 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2005); Michel-
son v. Wyatt, 880 A.2d 458 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2005).
49 See Protection & Advocacy System, Inc. v. Freudenthal,
412 F. Supp.2d 1211 (D.Wyo. 2006).
50 See Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, 2006 WL
1390423 (N.D.Cal. May 18, 2006); Rodriguez v. Folksamerica
Reinsurance Co., 2006 WL 1359119 (D.Conn. May 15, 2006);
Anderson v. City of New York, 2006 WL 1134117 (E.D.N.Y.
April 28, 2006); Rice v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL
1128223 (D.Idaho April 26, 2006); Rosales v. City of Bakers-
field, 2006 WL 988605 (E.D.Cal. April 13, 2006).
51 See Shemonic v. Manoff, 2006 WL 741447 (S.D.Ill. March
21, 2006); Holzle v. Healthcare Services Group, Inc., 801
N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y.Sup. 2005); Northwestern Mem’l Hosp. v.
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 2004).
52 Northwestern Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 925
(7th Cir. 2004); See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 2006
WL 2831035 (D. Me. Oct. 3, 2006); Sunrise Opportunities, Inc.
v. Regier, 2006 WL 581150 (N.D.Ill. March 7, 2006); U.S. ex rel.
Camillo v. Ancilla Systems, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 520 (S.D.Ill. 2005);
Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F. Supp.2d 136, 139 (D.D.C. 2005);
EEOC v. Boston Market Corp., 2004 WL 3327264 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 16, 2004); National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 2004
WL 555701 (S.D.N.Y. March 19, 2004).
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required, under HIPAA. Covered entities have the
power under HIPAA—through their adoption of explicit
disclosure policies—to determine the circumstances
and extent of disclosure, including arguably the extent
to which they will comply with variable state disclosure
laws (although, as previously noted, a decision by the
covered entity not to comply with a state law require-
ment is undertaken at the entity’s peril).
If anything, HIPAA—far from being undermined by
the continued vitality of more stringent state laws—
permits covered entities to substitute their own uniform
policies for variable state disclosure laws. If covered en-
tities desire to disclose the requested PHI, they gener-
ally can do so either by adopting a disclosure policy that
permits disclosure, by observing a state reporting re-
quirement, or by exercising an exception to a state
privilege law. Based on the cases under HIPAA to date,
covered entities that do not want to disclose informa-
tion stand an excellent chance of persuading a court
that HIPAA classifies most disclosures as permitted and
therefore, the decision to disclose is up to the entity.
Whether covered entities understand their power to de-
termine health information transparency and establish
such norms is doubtful at this point, given the extensive
litigation seeking clarification of duties and rights un-
der HIPAA.
Third, courts are consistent in their view that HIPAA
creates no new substantive evidentiary rights but in-
stead sets up a process for managing and disclosing
PHI, a process that centralizes decisionmaking within
the covered entity itself as part of the Privacy Rule’s
permitted disclosure provisions. Moreover, courts ap-
pear to dismiss the relevance of state evidentiary law as
a means of processing the disclosure and management
of PHI when the issue is one arising under federal law
and the judicial forum is federal.
Fourth, were Congress to attempt to legislate unifor-
mity in health information law, many of the most im-
portant applications of these changes would come in
the context of states’ legal processes, not in a health
care quality or information transparency context. In
this vein, more compelling policy development would
appear to be initiatives aimed at fostering the diffusion
of the technology essential to the adoption and use of
health information systems capable of routinely provid-
ing the public with vital information about the quality
and safety of care.
Based on our review of the HIPAA privacy cases, we
find nothing to suggest that the preservation of more
stringent state laws creates a barrier to interoperability
of HIT systems that can produce public information
about system performance. Indeed, if anything, the cur-
rent HIPAA privacy standard may confer on covered
entities greater power to shield information than might
be desirable in an age of health information transpar-
ency. Courts understand HIPAA as vesting covered en-
tities with the power to determine the extent of PHI dis-
closure under state law, even state laws whose disclo-
sure obligations are compelled by overarching public
health policy concerns (such as disclosures of PHI re-
lated to a public health threat and during a time of pub-
lic health emergency declared under state law).53
Whether HIPAA could be invoked to prevent a state
from pursuing affirmative information transparency ef-
forts using de-identified and aggregated data remains
to be seen.
To the extent that there is the potential for more
stringent state laws to limit access to PHI essential to
safety and quality, such a barrier is not evident in the
HIPAA litigation to date. One explanation is that there
are few state laws that meet the ‘‘more stringent than’’
test, thereby suggesting that such wide variability is
more myth than reality. Another is that where state law
in fact is more stringent, providers are aware of the law
and thus routinely do not seek the information. This
custom of avoiding certain health information because
consent is required poses a serious problem for health
care quality improvement.
A key step to clarify the fact that neither HIPAA nor
state laws pose barriers to health care quality improve-
ment or transparency systems would be comprehensive
guidance from the HHS Office for Civil rights explain-
ing HIPAA’s relevance to such initiatives and how com-
pliance can be achieved. States that set independent
privacy laws might consider undertaking parallel ef-
forts to clarify the legality of health information use as
part of transparency and quality improvement initia-
tives.
Were Congress to consider the legal option of further
expanding HIPAA preemption to substitute uniform
federal standards for those more stringent state laws
that do exist, such a legal approach to uniformity would
raise several important implications.
First, Congress would be required to revisit the very
difficult question of privacy of personally identifiable
health information that would compel a substantive bal-
ancing of intensely held personal health interests
against broader questions of public health and welfare.
Although this balancing of personal versus public con-
siderations is a traditional feature of the lawmaking
process, the question of whether to undertake an effort
to set a HIPAA ceiling, as well as a HIPAA floor, is a
complicated one. HIPAA already preempts state disclo-
sure laws to establish a federal privacy floor. Given the
extremely limited evidence of a negative impact that the
existence of more stringent state laws has had, the
policy question is whether there is a justification for un-
dertaking a strenuous effort to set a privacy ceiling, es-
pecially when the issues that would need to be ad-
dressed involve some of the most personal in all of
health care and are inextricably linked to the function-
ing of state civil and criminal judicial process.
Second, it is not clear that a broadening of HIPAA
preemption would limit legal uncertainty and litigation.
Were Congress to adopt a ‘‘field preemption’’ approach,
that is, to preempt all state health information law, the
result would be continuing judicial involvement and un-
certainty. While this approach has been urged by some
as part of the debate over the pending health informa-
tion systems legislation, no greater clarity or reduction
in litigation is likely to result from such a change be-
cause the courts still will be involved in HIPAA cases.
Broad field preemption in the privacy arena requires
statutory language preempting state laws that ‘‘relate
to’’ health information privacy to achieve the goal of es-
tablishing a single uniform standard for the manage-
ment and disclosure of PHI. Even limiting preemption
to those state laws ‘‘connected with’’ privacy, confiden-
tiality, or security would not eliminate the potential for
53 In addition, in cases of national emergency, the Project
BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276 (July 21, 2004), 118
STAT. 835, authorizes the HHS secretary to suspend certain
provisions of HIPAA.
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ever-expanding litigation, since, as this review of
HIPAA preemption cases illustrates, it is not the merits
of underlying state privacy laws that are at issue, but
rather, disputes regarding state laws that have precisely
the opposite purpose, i.e., to compel the disclosure of
PHI as part of the legal process and the operation of
state judicial systems. That Congress would desire to
entrench itself more deeply in the state legal process
seems unlikely.
For a sobering example of how difficult it is to craft a
federal law that would eliminate or drastically reduce
uncertainty and litigation by preempting state law, one
only needs to look at the example of the broad preemp-
tion that Congress adopted in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In ERISA § 514,
Congress set out to preempt all state laws that ‘‘relate
to’’ employee benefit plans covered by ERISA, except
those regulating insurance, banking, and securities. In
the more than three decades since ERISA’s enactment,
considerable litigation over the meaning of ERISA’s
preemption clause has occurred, and yet we still do not
know with certainty the extent of permissible state
health regulation. More than 20 ERISA preemption
cases have traveled to the Supreme Court alone, and as
Justice David Souter so aptly described the problem in
one of those cases, as a practical matter, everything ‘‘re-
lates to’’ everything else.54
As Congress and the administration move forward to
encourage the acceleration of electronic health infor-
mation systems, removing legal barriers to adoption is
clearly important. However, identifying these barriers
and determining how best to remove or minimize them
requires careful examination of the factual and opera-
tional basis for concern, as well as the potential impact
of various alternative solutions. Although this review
suggests that the current HIPAA preemption standard
does not pose a barrier to provider access to treatment
information through interoperable systems, important
challenges do remain, chiefly where reconciling HIPAA
with other federal laws is concerned, particularly pri-
vacy laws related to federal health care financing pro-
grams such as Medicaid (whose own privacy statute has
yet to be conformed to the modern expectations of
HIPAA), as well as privacy standards relevant to certain
forms of federally funded treatment, such as treatment
for substance abuse.
Study Limitations
Several limitations with respect to this analysis
should be noted. First, we considered only reported
cases in which there was a decision on the merits of the
applicability of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, including pre-
emption. Anecdotally, we have heard of instances in
which a provider sought information from another cov-
ered entity holding PHI for treatment purposes but was
unable to obtain it. Since HIPAA expressly permits such
disclosures, we presume that these types of conflicts
may be relatively few and tend to get resolved between
the covered entities involved.
Second, we did not examine the underlying state
laws themselves to identify the full range of laws that
might fall into the ‘‘more stringent’’ test. Indeed, we
have concerns that such an examination might prove
futile, since many state laws that turn out to be more
stringent than HIPAA may arise, not in the context of
privacy or confidentiality statutes, but in a legal process
or evidentiary context, or some other context wholly
unrelated to the substance of health information pri-
vacy itself.
Although this review of the HIPAA privacy cases,
particularly those that focus on preemption, does not
support the argument that HIPAA preemption poses a
barrier to HIT interoperability, by providing policymak-
ers with an accurate picture of the legal landscape un-
der HIPAA, a more thorough examination of the poten-
tial trade-offs between electronic health information
systems and privacy protections for individuals be-
comes possible.
54 New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (‘‘If ‘relate
to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indetermi-
nacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never
run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop no-
where,’ H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World’s
Classics 1980)’’).
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